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Abstract 
This article suggests that the academic emphasis on rational choice and political-sociological approaches 
to party development has led to a misleading impression of convergence with Western patterns of 
programmatic competition and growing partisan identification in the Central European party political 
scene. As an alternative thesis, the author argues that the very character of ‘transition’ politics in Eastern 
Europe and the necessarily self-referential nature of the parliamentary game has structured party systems 
in those countries, and that the differences between the party systems in this region are critically related to 
experiences under communism (–a political-historical explanation). The paper argues that, in order to 
cope with a practical lack of public policy options in major areas such as the economy, parties have had 
little choice but to compete over operating ‘styles,’ rather than over substantive (ideologically based) 
programmatic alternatives. The development of parties incumbent in government since 1989 may be 
compared to the development of catch-all parties in Western Europe in terms of the competitive logic of 
weakening/ avoiding ideological positions in order to embrace a large constituency. However, successful 
parties in Eastern Europe lack the ‘baggage’ of an ideological past and the history of mass membership 
and a class or denominational clientele – their defining characteristic is that they try to appeal to all of the 
people all of the time.   2
Introduction 
 
Few institutional developments are more critical to democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe than the 
development of stable and representative parties, competing with accuracy and intensity over the salient 
issues of the day. Where parties fail it will hardly matter how efficient other institutions of state may have 
become during the transition from communism; the new system as such will lack legitimacy and will be 
vulnerable to take-over or sustained inefficiency and instability. 
 
With the shift in the academic literature from an emphasis on transition in Eastern Europe to one of demo-
cratic consolidation,
1 the issue of party competition in the region should logically move centre-stage and 
indeed it has: we understand far more about the competitive staying power of the communist successor 
parties in particular
2 and there is a growing body of literature examining patterns of competition and party 
strategy in individual countries and across the region as a whole.
3  
 
In what follows I attempt a further overview of trends of party competition in the region using Western 
models of party competition as a heuristic, and by drawing from the already rich theoretical debate and 
empirical data. The paper argues that the academic emphasis on rational choice and political-sociological 
approaches to party development in Eastern Europe to date has tended to give a misleading impression of 
stabilisation, convergence with Western patterns of programmatic competition and growing partisan iden-
tification across the Central European party scene. Even in those two cases seeing an indisputable shift to-
ward programmatic competition – Poland and Hungary – these systems too remain peculiarly vulnerable. 
The reasons for this become clear once the political challenges of post-communist reform are factored 
back into the analysis. Once political constraints are taken into account it is apparent that the pressures of 
dismantling the communist system have left little space for substantive competition over policy options in 
major areas such as the economy. Political parties in government in this region have been harnessed to an 
agenda of necessary reforms and yet when running for election must still be seen to compete and to offer 
electoral alternatives. To do the latter convincingly, parties have learned how to compete over operating 
styles rather than over programmatic substance and voters, as a result, have reasonably developed doubts 
about the meaningfulness of their electoral choices along the lines of the joke: ‘Don’t vote: the govern-
ment will get in.’ 
 
The term ‘valence issue’ is commonly used in electoral studies to describe ‘issues on which all parties de-
clare the same objective but dispute each other’s competence in achieving the desired policy.’
4 In post-
communist Europe, political entrepreneurs may or may not be explicit in declaring ‘the same objectives’– 
but they have had to attempt reform policies in practice, because elections are free and incumbents can be 
evicted from office if conditions are seen to deteriorate too steeply or with little prospect of improvement. 
(There is one substantive strategic choice available to political entrepreneurs, however, and that is to stall 
or to abandon the reform process for short term electoral gain – this strategy has proven economically 
devastating to the countries concerned and the paper will discuss why that choice has been taken in some 
states and not others later). Since there is little choice in policy to be had, politicians in the region have 
had little alternative to appeal to ‘who they are’ and their own credible skills rather than to substantive 
policy commitments when running for office. The political party system thus offers electoral accountabil-
ity but not policy accountability, since the electoral system is capable of getting rid of parties but not, it 
seems, of shaping policies in critical areas of government. For the remainder of this paper ‘programmatic 
competition’ is understood as a competition where “parties announce identifiable and differing commit-
ments to realise binding political decisions and collective goods they intend to deliver to society, were 
their representatives elected to political office”
5 –  with special attention being paid to the ‘binding’ part. 
   3
Party Competition in Central Europe – A Road Map… 
 
When asking the basic analytical question of ‘what explains the evolution of party systems in Eastern 
Europe,’ the most prominent answers of the last ten years have fallen broadly into two types of explana-
tions. On the one hand, economic theories (in which the median voter is the central actor in politics), have 
focused on the likely preferences of winners and losers in transition; an approach dominated in the early 
1990s by Herbert Kitschelt.
6 (More recently Kitschelt has combined arguments from winners and losers 
with complex path-dependency arguments from interwar and communist legacies.) On the other, we have 
seen political-sociological theories, focusing on the idea that parties express stable underlying social iden-
tities, with theorists attempting to identify which underlying social identities have proven most salient in 
‘transition.’ This approach is exemplified by Geoffrey Evans’ and Stephen Whitfield’s argument that 
post-communist parties will position themselves on the major social cleavages emerging from economic 
development, levels of ethnic homogeneity and the historic status of the state.
7 There is insufficient space 
here to do justice to the full theoretical debate as it has emerged, however, it is worth outlining some of 
the basic controversies arising from these two theoretical approaches: economic and political/sociological.  
 
To take the economic approach first; the claim that party competition is likely to have a socio-economic 
basis has been highly dependent upon rational choice reasoning; such theories have tended to admit little 
autonomy of the political. To assume, a priori, the primacy of economic rationality over politics in deter-
mining the bases of political development in Eastern Europe, however, is arguably ill-advised in a region 
renowned for its historical étatism and for the autonomy of elites in dictating political developments. Pure 
applications of rational choice logic have come close to assuming an institutionally ‘frictionless’ environ-
ment – also a dubious theoretical starting point in the case of a transition from totalitarianism. Theories of 
party system development based on the logic of electoral preferences among winners and losers must, in 
addition, carry strong assumptions about the representative nature of political parties; they must assume 
that parties will offer a well-defined choice about being pro-market or not, and that parties will compete 
on the basis of offering clear and consistent alternative opportunities – if not at the beginning of the tran-
sition, then soon, essentially once marketization gets underway. 
 
In practice in this region, however, political parties emerged overwhelmingly from within the parliamen-
tary system, not out of the economic fault-lines or cleavages within society. Instead of emerging from the 
grassroots, the Central European parties that have thrived in the 1990s emerged from the parliamentary 
factions of the umbrella anti-communist movements or from the old communist or communist satellite 
parties. In developing out of the organisations of and against the regime – i.e. out of the ‘black and white’ 
divide of the revolution – the capacity of parties to help form and to manipulate electoral preferences was 
accentuated from the very beginning, whilst the expressive and representational functions ideally attrib-
uted to parliamentary parties in a liberal democracy were minimised.
8 Economic rationality arguments, 
which depicted Central European politics as emerging from, or in lock-step with, the tangible ‘pocket-
book’ logic of the electorate, were misleading about the institutional ordering of political life as we could 
(with hindsight!) observe it. Moreover, the assumption that parties would emerge and eventually locate 
themselves along axes comprised of pro-market and pro-state positions would require that parties gravi-
tate ‘naturally’ towards rational equilibrium solutions even when short term electoral interests might dic-
tate radically different behaviour. Most importantly of all, mainstream Central European politics proved 
more essentially pro-market in its practice, if not in its promises, than many of us had dared anticipate. 
Through 1993 and 1994 even ‘post-socialist’ camps revealed their pro-market colours when elected to 
government in both Hungary and Poland. The stuff of party competition therefore, remained unresolved 
by inferences from the distribution of economic resources.  
   4
Political-sociological theories have also had trouble accommodating the parliamentary route of party de-
velopment after 1989. If we take political-sociological theories of party development to be based on the 
idea that parties express stable underlying social identities, such theories face a major problem in identi-
fying which social identities ‘count’, since parties in this region did not emerge slowly from known social 
divides but extremely rapidly out of a revolutionary regime divide – i.e. out of the anti-communist blocs 
elected to parliament in the first free elections. Since parties entered parliament having represented soci-
ety only as a protesting anti-communist mass it has proven extremely difficult to demonstrate a deeper 
connection to social cleavages; the development of any stable identification being carried further into 
question by persistently high rates of voter volatility. This is not merely a methodological problem, 
moreover.
9 The more essential fact is that, even if stable social identities had existed in 1989, the process 
of political, social and economic transformation over the last ten years has thrown these societies into a 
period of quite exceptionally rapid evolution. 
 
In order to accommodate the idea of rapid change political sociologists have tended to resort to the abun-
dant evidence that at least the most fundamental structural cleavages in societies – such as class, religion 
or ethnicity - have tended to prove productive of political identities elsewhere. However, if the communist 
experience is taken seriously then even ‘classic’ social divides are decidedly open to question: the as-
sumption that socio-economic divisions will drive party competition assumes that parties are free to ar-
ticulate a real choice between distribution and market, but this is arguably not the case in post-communist 
transition until there is a return to something approaching sustained economic growth;
10 the assumption 
by Evans and Whitfield that one can distinguish clearly between established and non-established states 
ignores the fact that every post-communist state underwent a politically exploitable crisis of identity fol-
lowing the collapse of communism. Similarly, if it is assumed that quantitative distributions of nationali-
ties dictate the likelihood of nationalistic politics it remains unclear precisely when, with what quantity of 
national heterodoxy, this cross-cutting cleavage may kick-in. To the contrary, one might argue that issues 
such as immigration, foreign investment, security and/or foreign ‘dominance’ (read ‘Western’ or ‘Rus-
sian’) or less than stable neighbours might make extreme national/ethnic homogeneity as productive of 
nationalist politics as ethnic heterodoxy, given the anxiety-producing character of the post-communist 
transformation. As with theoretical approaches focusing on economic rationality, political-sociological 
analyses have tended to leave little room for issues of political, institutional or elite power, either in re-
gard to existing institutional opportunity structures, the capacity of elites to mobilise constituencies or to 
manipulate electoral preferences.  
 
The questions of what attaches parties to society and of where parties have come from have more recently 
prompted the development of path-dependency theories of political development that seek to recognise 
and to integrate the impact of interwar and communist historical legacies – the great difficulty here being 
to isolate in rigorous ways the impact of the communist system as such.
11 In this vein, Post-Communist 
Party Systems (1999) by Kitschelt et al. examines the extent to which programmatic appeals and constitu-
ency linkages characterise new party systems in four cases, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Bulgaria, and in explaining the roots of these linkages the authors offer a sophisticated sequential model 
of party development that emphasises the interwar and communist legacies in shaping cleavage formation 
in the new democracies.
12 Kitschelt et al. make an extremely powerful case for the integration of legacy 
arguments in explaining, in particular, the evident variation in degrees of programmatic competition 
among the various countries. Their development model also, critically, suggests that electoral institutions 
(electoral laws and executive-legislative relations) only become important as exogenous determinants of 
party competitive strategies over time, having been essentially endogenous to the political process in the 
early 1990s, the immediate post-revolutionary years.
13 One of the most controversial aspects of Post-
Communist Party Systems, however, is that it does not make it clear whether, how or why political pro-  5
cesses and ‘cognitive legacies’ from the interwar period have somehow survived and remained salient – 
in this theory, apparently more salient – than those cognitive legacies of the communist period. Indeed, 
Kitschelt et al. appear to operate with extremely strong assumptions about the tenacity and vitality of in-
terwar legacies, democratic legacies in particular. This raises important issues of how, by what means 
(and among whom?) should these competing models have survived, not just in some vague form of per-
sonal memory, but with sufficient coherence and personnel to ‘trump’ the distribution of power and re-
sources left over from the communist order. 
 
In pursuit of this last issue this paper suggests that, if it is possible to indicate that all party political elites 
in transition have a significant capacity to frame and to manipulate electoral choices then actually, the na-
ture and strength of possible political legacies in terms of programmes and ideas, whatever their origins, 
are less important than Kitschelt et al. imply. This is not to adopt a tabula rasa approach; the communist 
legacy is clearly critical in determining who is around to do what with any credibility. However, Kitschelt 
et al. argue that “the parties of Central Europe are parliamentary-centred”
14 – but this can be stated far 
more strongly; those parties that have proved successful since 1989 have been essentially parliament 
born-and-bred, developing all-embracing electoral strategies and policies that revealed them to be far 
more flexible/pragmatic than a strong emphasis on pre-1989 legacies/path dependency arguments would 
necessarily imply. The nature of the post-communist transition is such that parties, in order to be suc-
cessful, have had to adapt to extraordinarily constrained conditions of party competition, the early con-
straints of profound economic reform being extended further by the growing policy imperatives of Euro-
pean Union, and in three cases, of NATO integration.  
 
As already mentioned in the introduction, in addition to theory-driven analyses of competition there has 
already been much in-depth analysis of the adaptation of former communist parties to power in Poland 
and Hungary.
15 In addition to the latter pieces, which are notable for examining the substance of political 
programme development in one part of the political scene, there are also a growing number of single 
country-based studies, typified by expert historical accounts of individual elections and of how elected 
parties subsequently act in government.
16 Crucially, the evidence these substantive articles present tends 
to emphasise the continuing autonomy of party from electorate, the importance of the communist inheri-
tance and the nature of the transition itself in establishing party constellations and political opportunity 
structures, and, above all, the weakness of the programmatic element of party competition in a good deal 
of contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. Bearing these findings, and the broader theoretical literature 
on Western European party competition in mind, what follows is an alternative model of party competi-
tion in Central Europe, more than three elections down the line. 
 
An Alternative Model 
 
If we take the most telling indicator of party system stabilisation to be the absence of new parties, then 
Central European party systems without exception remain unstable. Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slo-
vak Republics, Bulgaria and Romania have all seen the emergence of either new parties, new coalitions, 
party-mergers, or party-makeovers amounting to a significant shift in party identity within the last few 
years. Several countries, moreover, look set to see the disappearance of previously successful post-
communist political parties from the electoral map. If we take this to be mere surface instability, and 
search instead for stability in allegiance to ideological blocs (thus investigating “deep volatility” in vot-
ing), then we hit on a significant measurement problem. The conventional measurement of voter volatility 
by bloc across the left/right divide cannot be applied easily in a region where the policy limitations im-
posed by reform mean that most mainstream parties feel constrained to endorse free market reform and to 
minimise redistribution. Dismantling the planned economy, ending economic stagnation, the decline in 
living standards and European Union entry (the latter being dependent upon the former) have tended not   6
so much to provoke clear and consistent left-right competition as to prove valance issues. Where pro-
market positions were not clear in rhetoric they have emerged in practice – once parties have been elected 
to government.
17 Over time, therefore, as the valence character of dismantling central planning and push-
ing for growth has become clear, it has made it increasingly difficult to place parties decisively on a left/ 
right scale and, I would argue, potentially misleading to try.  
 
With the left/right division in economic terms excluded, finding a measure of economic attitudes that co-
heres well with anything approaching party ‘blocs’ becomes extremely difficult. The solution for many 
analysts has been to come up with new typologies and to try to monitor shifting voter support between 
their assigned ‘blocs’ accordingly.
18 However, even these efforts are compelled into measurement prob-
lems since throughout the last ten years major parties in most countries have been either sufficiently 
vague in policy terms or have changed their character radically enough to make the coherent monitoring 
of voter shifts by ‘bloc’ as an indicator of system stability – however that bloc is labelled – questionable. 
The more interesting analytical questions are surely those of how major parties continue to shift their 
ground in order to compete while compelled to remain essentially pro-market-liberalisation when in gov-
ernment and, secondly, of why once explicitly pro-liberalisation parties might abandon this supposedly 
core ideological trait for, typically, populist and far more economically unpredictable and reckless stances 
(see ‘Slovakia’ – below). For the analyst, however, the capturing of economic orientation in voting must 
surely remain a discrete but critical factor. A measure for allegiance to a political bloc, say, across a relig-
ious/secular divide that excludes economic attitudes is, in conditions of basic economic fragility – hardly 
able to demonstrate party system stability one way or another. Even in those few cases where there is evi-
dence of stabilisation in party identification and social cleavage, most obviously, across religious divides, 
these specific cases can tell us very little about the longer term stabilisation of the party system in toto. 
 
The argument of this paper is that continued party system instability may be shown to be a direct conse-
quence of the type of party competition emerging in Eastern Europe, more specifically, a consequence of 
a dominant type of electoral strategy. In claiming the existence of a dominant competitive strategy the 
focus is only on those parties that have proved successful in post-1989 electoral politics, namely on those 
parties and coalitions that have been incumbent in government after 1989. The article is based on the 
party systems of Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania and Bulgaria, countries 
selected on the principle of ‘most similar systems design’
19 insofar as they all experienced a Soviet-type-
system for a similar period of time; forty years. After 1989, moreover, these states are all in intention at 
least, parliamentary systems
20 – in contrast to the states of the former Soviet Union. In addition of course 
none of these states participated in war since 1989, the element that clearly distinguishes party political 
developments in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.  
 
The paper seeks to explain two things: firstly, the origins and character of successful electoral strategies 
in this region after 1989, the second; to try to explain why different countries have developed different 
constellations of political parties. The paper’s working hypotheses are as follows: the explanatory variable 
accounting for a dominant electoral strategy in the region is the existence of fundamental political con-
straints in transition – i.e., the dominance of valence issues in party competition. The explanatory variable 
accounting for different constellations of party competition in different countries, is that of state-society 
relations under communism; the experience of communism in different countries varied according to the 
intensity of the system in shutting down non-Party/non-ideological social organisation. This variable con-
siders the degree of societal repression or mediation under communism as a determinant of who is avail-
able to ‘play’ the dominant strategy and in what credible forms, after 1989.  
 
On the question of state-society relations, Following Kitschelt et al. this paper will characterise commu-
nist regimes as having taken three forms:
21 patrimonial communism
22 (Romania, Bulgaria), national-  7
accommodative communism
23 (Hungary and Poland) and bureaucratic-authoritarian communism
24 (Czech 
and Slovak Republics – as the Czechoslovak state). By focusing on the question of repression and “Com-
munist Particisation” of society, however, the paper argues that the legacies of patrimonial and bureau-
cratic-authoritarian communist regimes (Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak republics) are 
more similar than Kitschelt et al. have suggested, leaving the legacies of the less successfully repressive 
national-accommodative regimes as the most ‘favourable’ i.e., conducive to programmatic competition 
(and not bureaucratic-authoritarian legacies – as Kitschelt et al. argue). The main difference between pat-
rimonial and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, this paper argues, is not so much in the different charac-
ter of political elites available after 1989, but in the more basic issue of a country’s economic develop-
ment and in the reasonable prospects for rapid success in transition in economic terms; i.e., it has made 
more sense for a former communist apparatchik in Romania to sell himself as a populist whereas a former 
apparatchik in the Czech Republic or Slovakia could sell himself as a technocrat. All have had to attempt 
reforms in practice, but since economic reforms in the Czech Republic would clearly succeed more quick-
ly than in Romania it has made electoral sense for the former apparatchik in the Czech Republic to be ex-
plicit about trying. Finally, given the three varying types of communist experience in these case studies 
and the existence of one dominant competitive strategy in the region as a whole, the paper’s aim is to cap-
ture the limitations of interwar and communist legacies in explaining the type of party politics emerging 
after 1989.  
 
The Catch-All Party and Cartel Party in Western Europe  
 
In Western Europe, Otto Kirchheimer concluded by the 1960s that the era of the mass integration party 
was passing, and that, as a result, West European party systems were faced with the more or less irresisti-
ble rise of what he termed ‘catch-all parties.’
25 “The mass integration party” he argued, “the product of an 
age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself 
into a catch-all ‘people’ party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the 
masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a 
wider audience and more immediate electoral success.”
26 Kirchheimer then went on to list five character-
istics of the new catch-all party: 
 
•   a ‘drastic reduction of the party’s ideological baggage’ 
•   a ‘further strengthening of top leadership groups’ 
•   a ‘downgrading of the role of the individual party member’ 
•   a ‘de-emphasis of the class gardee, or of specific social-class or denominational clientele in favour of 
the recruitment of voters among the population at large. 
•   securing access to a variety of interest groups, to secure electoral support via interest group interces-
sion.
27 
  
In this way, Kirchheimer depicted a party that has sundered its close links with the mass electorate and 
has become remote from the everyday life of the citizen, even though for electoral reasons, the democratic 
catch-all party must continue to express widely felt popular concerns. Compared to mass parties the 
catch-all party performed the function of expressing public grievances and concerns subject essentially to 
changing tactical considerations, where before it would have been driven to a more consistent representa-
tion of certain interests and principles by both its ideology, and by the explicitly identified interests of its 
favoured class (or religious) constituency. In Western Europe of course, the shift was not to pure pragma-
tism or populism, but one away from strict ideological goals toward more tactically modulated principles, 
post-modern issues and a much greater concentration in general upon policy issues which would cause   8
minimum resistance in the community. Kircheimer presented the German CDU and SPD as classic catch-
all parties which had effectively diluted their original ideologies in order to widen their voter-base. 
 
While party systems in Western Europe have continued to develop beyond the catch-all model (not least 
to the ‘cartel model’
28), the original model remains enlightening when applied to post-1989 East Central 
Europe. In Western Europe a very particular socio-economic shift in the 1960s is said to have precipitated 
the shift to catch-all party strategies. The 1960s saw a gradual evolution away from class and religious 
identities to more diverse political identities, based among things, on the new social movements of the 
time. In communist East Central Europe, in contrast, the developments through the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s were those of ideological stagnation, and in post-invasion Czechoslovakia and in Bulgaria and 
Romania the complete suppression of political identity beyond communist orthodoxy. The less orthodox 
routes and indeed less successfully repressive routes were goulash communism in Hungary, where Janos 
Kadar experimented with a second economy, and consumer communism in Poland, where intense bor-
rowing from the West led to bankruptcy, the birth of the Solidarity movement and finally martial law. 
Nevertheless, both Hungary and Poland had, in essence, remained essentially closed, if relatively accom-
modative, authoritarian regimes. In revolutionary East Central Europe, would-be party politicians woke 
up after 1989 to the instant problem that they now had to find issues on which to compete, and to compete 
successfully. Here, ‘instant’ catch-all parties emerged as the optimum strategy for dealing with the lack of 
strong partisan political identities typical in the post-communist era. Such parties succeeded by seeking 
the conditional support of the electorate, competing on the open market rather than attempting to develop 
and to narrow that market. 
 
Instant Catch-All Parties in Post-Communist Europe  
 
One of the defining features of the East/Central European transition in its earliest years was that political 
strategists did not and could not know the nature and strength of political cultural continuity after commu-
nism. This made their position profoundly different from that of politicians developing ‘cartel parties’ in 
Western Europe – where cartel parties emerged out of traditions of inter-party cooperation, an abundance 
of state support and a high degree of issue and policy definition in the realm of transparently agreed socie-
tal goals. In post-communist Europe political strategists coming out of the most repressive regimes did 
not know which specific constituencies could now be mobilised in terms of partisan political identities, 
nor did they know the reform-pain thresholds of their electorates.
29 The first elections in each of these 
states were more like plebiscites on the basic issue of being ‘for change’/‘against communism,’ than any-
thing resembling a multidimensional party competition. Only Hungary has had a constellation of political 
parties in 1998 resembling that in 1990 but, as we shall see, Hungarian parties that have retained consis-
tent names have nevertheless changed significantly in their apparent political orientations. In these plebis-
citary first elections across the region the broad-based anti-communist coalition movements, (with dis-
sident groups at their core), performed most successfully, the exceptions here being Romania, an ambigu-
ous case where the National Salvation Front included dissident intellectuals but was quickly dominated by 
a faction, led by Ion Illiescu, still affiliated to the values of communism even though its leadership had re-
jected the Ceausescu regime. Another ambiguous exception is Bulgaria, where change had been spurred 
by the younger generation within the Party and a duly revamped Bulgarian Socialist Party held onto 
power against a still diffuse opposition. In each case cases though, it is apparent that the most credible 
agents of change were elected. In countries with strong dissident movements then the victory was for anti-
communist blocs that carried these long-time opponents of communism.
30 
 
What these changes would look like in practice and what the electorate would stand by way of hardship 
could still only be guessed at in 1990 and 1991, however. It is important to recall that the ostensibly 
monolithic anti-communist civic movements were essentially only loosely knit networks – coalitions, but   9
more commonly, collections of groups whose diversity of opinion was successfully masked by their com-
mon rejection of communism. As broad coalitions they carried the most general agendas into these elec-
tions – they were for all good things – democratisation, marketisation – freedom and prosperity. Not only 
were these anti-communist movements full of various, still only vaguely categorised factions, but even 
within the factions there was little by way of political discipline in terms of consistent allegiance to 
groups. In the case of dissident circles there was considerable suspicion surrounding the idea of party dis-
cipline as such, deriving from the dissident philosophy of anti-politics and personal integrity, developed 
through the 1970s and 1980s. (For example, when the Czech Civic Forum finally splintered in 1991 it 
occurred in part over the issue of whether party organisation and discipline were necessary at all: the 
technocratic right argued it was essential, and the liberal dissidents objected that it contradicted the very 
spirit of the movement.) Once the decision to become a party had been taken, however, elites were free to 
formulate a party structure and party type unconstrained by any institutional legacies; they were not only 
quite new entities, but by emerging in parliament these parties were instantly known – instantly electoral 
players. 
 
It is a critical step in party development that the instant catch-all parties to emerge after 1989 on the 
whole organised themselves by forming parliamentary groups or factions from within already elected 
monolithic parliamentary blocks – the civic blocs: Solidarity in Poland, the Civic Forum and the Slovak 
Public Against Violence in Czechoslovakia, the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria, and the usurped 
National Salvation Front in Romania. 
 
The fact that the first stages of instant catch-all party building occurred within the parliamentary arena 
would have extremely important consequences for party-identification. The figuring-out of political 
strategies on the basis of competition for political space as seen from within the existing parliamentary 
arena was necessarily an exceptionally top down process, and a highly abstract intellectual process at that. 
Consequently, a type of party emerged which was formed, initially without reference to known or pre-
dictable constituencies (the exceptions here being Poland and to a lesser extent in Hungary, where oppo-
sition forces were strong and clearly embedded in social constituencies, offering politicians significantly 
less room for manoeuvre than in both former patrimonial and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes). These 
new parties, or rather, the factions which now emerged and instituted themselves as parties, had tremen-
dous freedom to define the new social reality themselves, to define the political space in relation to how 
other competing elites defined it – rather than as a response to any evident cleavages or new disputes 
within post-communist ‘society’ as such (beyond the question of the status of the communists – the most 
obvious controversy in the aftermath of the revolution). However, political strategies did face two major 
contextual constraints: the first was that of tremendous social and institutional flux. The second was that 
the possible arena of party competition was severely circumscribed by the new political constraints of 
transition as such: the standards for economic reform were clear – half-measures, as attempted in Hungary 
and Poland in the last decades of communism, in Czechoslovakia in the very last years – had failed – and 
liberalisation and full restructuring could no longer be avoided anywhere if productivity was to improve 
and sustainable growth to return; a view emphatically endorsed by Western advice. Only a few years later 
the standards for European Union entry were presented as faits accompli from the West; as policies 
around which there was little room for competition insofar economic growth and European entry were 
still seen as not simply public goods but public necessities. The issues implicit in marketisation and har-
monisation with Union norms duly emerged as valance issues. The critical consideration then for political 
strategists was an estimation of the reform pain-threshold of their societies.
31  
 
The overwhelmingly valence nature of party competition in practice meant that the most entrepreneurial 
parties have developed a strategy for distinguishing themselves competitively by an emphasis on, respec-  10
tively; reform priorities in terms of the sequencing of reforms, credibility on the delivery of reforms, and 
most importantly, on the chosen modus operandi of the party – in other words, on the operating style or at 
most, operating morality, of the party – something that falls far short of a coherent ideological position. In 
the bid to capture the largest constituency, such parties only explicitly dare the most consensual of com-
mitments (often regardless of feasibility), and have sought only the most highly conditional form of sup-
port, in this respect, they share the competitive logic of Western European catch-all parties – they attempt 
to open up the electoral market – but they clearly lack the ‘baggage’ of an ideological past and the history 
of mass membership and a class or denominational clientele;
32 indeed, more than that, instant catch-all 
parties must necessarily avoid competing over ideological programmatic commitments as far as possible 
since any new government will be harnessed to an agenda of ‘necessary reforms,’ something they must 
then attempt to manage without destroying their own popularity; stalling and half-measures being one ob-
vious compromise solution in cases where public tolerance for reform pain looks low. The defining char-
acteristic of ‘instant catch-all parties’ is that they try to appeal to all of the people, all of the time.  
 
Those exceptional cases of ‘instant catch-all parties’ which possess a distinct mass base – the communist 
successor parties – have, with the exception of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, main-
tained a section of their former mass bases despite repudiating the ideological connection of communism. 
The failure of ‘historical parties,’ the relative failure of constituency or interest-based parties (in other 
words – more predictably programmatic parties) and the continuing success of these instant catch-all 
parties might imply that communism, but in particular communism of the patrimonial or bureaucratic-
authoritarian type, had a significant impact in destroying or eroding pre-communist, but also communist- 
era partisan political identities. More obviously, however, the emergence of a dominant electoral strategy 
across the board reflects the extreme restrictions in policy choices faced by East European countries in 
transition; restrictions that ‘nostalgic parties’ can only fail to wish away.  
 
The region has seen the emergence of three very specific forms of instant catch-all party: technocratic, 
nationalist and populist. By technocratic I mean parties which claim to have the technical expertise which 
will carry the population through the transition (in emphasising professionalism one might argue that 
these come closest to the Western model of ‘cartel party’, except that they do not operate in party-
colluding, ‘cartelised systems’). By populist I mean parties which try to mobilise the entire electorate by 
convincing them that they, above all other parties, care most about the ordinary person.
33 In the case of 
nationalists, the party tries to mobilise the population on the basis of national identity - but clearly, many 
ideas and policy options may be logically attached to the basic principle of national identity.
34 The styles 
that have been chosen have been highly contingent on the specific communist legacy of 1989 in terms of 
the background and disposition of political elites created by the communist experience, and the credibility 
with which they might adopt one, or a combination of these three strategies. The critical point distinguish-
ing Polish and Hungarian competition is that in both countries before 1989 the continuous need for the 
Party to evolve to sustain even a minimum of legitimacy allowed for the existence of non-ideological, re-
formist technocratic elites within the Party, and these elites proved capable of transforming themselves 
into credible transition technocrats after 1989. Consequently, their historical ideological legacy has 
proved negligible in its impact on eventual policy choice,
35 (in contrast to the Czech case, where the Com-
munist Party is barely reconstructed even to the point of retaining the Communist Party name – uniquely 
in the region). By allowing for the existence of technocratic parties on both sides of the systems divide 
after 1989, Poland and Hungary emerged with a stable mainstream core of parties that were explicitly 
pro-reform. A legacy of national-accommodative communism was also that relatively open social divides 
had survived, and these proved capable of supporting stable religious and peasant parties after 1989 which 
added further structure to Polish and Hungarian political life, allowing for more nuanced, programmatic 
politics around a relatively explicit reform consensus.   11
Technocratic, nationalistic and populist principles are all highly, indeed, maximally flexible in how they 
can be used to legitimate any policy after the fact; their identities as parties hardly commit them even to a 
basic left-right preference on policy making, be it left or right as considered for cultural or economic is-
sues.
36 Because of their fundamentally non-committal nature as parties (beyond their standard claim to be 
pro-reform in principle) instant catch-all parties retain a huge amount of flexibility in terms of what actual 
policies they choose to campaign on, what policies they will adopt once in power, and leeway in deciding 
precisely how to develop, as parties, in the future. The most decisive historical inheritance has been that 
those not irredeemably identified with the former regime straightforwardly opted for self-identification as 
anti-communist – an identification which continues to play a prominent role in party competition in each 
of the case countries. By competing on their various modus operandi (the application of expertise, the 
pursuit of national realisation and the solution of grievances respectively) elites may obscure the lack of 
realistic policy options during the transition, even as they provide extreme leeway in terms of ultimate 
policy choices. Such identities are ideal – and entirely rational - for elites coping with the extreme de-
mands of post-communist transformation, but they have distinct consequences for the emergence of party 
competition, and the democratising benefits that are supposed to come with it. A party that defines policy 
‘on the hop’, i.e., in an ad hoc fashion after it has been elected, creates many problems; not only is it diffi-
cult for an opposition party to pin down a governing party’s faults, but it is also extremely difficult to de-
velop clear lines of party identification, not only for individuals, but also for interest groups and civil in-
stitutions. Without clear party identification beyond the generalities of being communist/anti-communist 
or nationalist versus populist, the isolation of civil society from the state, and the instability, if not vulner-
ability of the democratic party system as such may be perpetuated.  
 
Of course, each type of strategy; nationalist, technocratic or populist, hardly exists in a pure form – most 
instant catch-all parties blend elements of all three with one aspect typically dominating, though in turn, 
the central style may shift. A variety of problems have arisen with this new type of party. Where only one 
instant catch-all party has emerged – essentially having hit upon the strategy first – it tended to dominate 
the new party system to such a degree as to make party competition extremely difficult – the Czech Civic 
Democratic Party, the Slovak Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Party of Social Democracy in 
Romania being cases in point – all legatees of either patrimonial or bureaucratic-authoritarian communist 
regimes. When more than one catch-all party has emerged and competition appears between various 
forms of the new types of catch-all party – essentially the case by the mid 1990s in Bulgaria, Romania 
and eventually in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, say between nationalists and populists, populists and 
technocrats, or between a combination of all three, party competition has remained at an extremely high 
level of political abstraction, and where civil society is weak and international pressure on specific policy 
options extremely strong, politicians have had few incentives or pressures to develop party competition 
on a less abstract basis, since all are set to pursue only a modification of what is in many respects an inter-
national policy agenda. However, in those two countries which have seen the development of more than 
one credible technocratic party, Poland and Hungary, we are seeing the development of a significantly 
deeper degree of party competition. In Poland and Hungary the reform communists have managed to re-
invent themselves as credible technocratic, social liberal parties of the centre left, in contrast to the 
classically liberal technocratic parties of the right and so, emerging out of a competition sharing many 
common terms, it has been possible to identify a higher degree of policy debate, ideological definition, 
and assertive criticism about the validity of, and room for manoeuvre within the policy restrictions implic-
itly imposed by the expectations of international institutions, the European Union in particular. 
 
Before turning to the evidence and a discussion of why it is that some countries have developed more than 
one instant catch-all party and why they have adopted the operating styles that they have it is important to 
recall, when gauging politicians’ incentives to shift strategy from a vague ‘instant’ catch-all strategy to a   12
more precise and accountable form, that those parties which chose ‘ideological’ or ‘constituency-based’ 
strategies over non-ideological instant catch-all strategies have done badly – and in countries escaping pa-
trimonial or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes they have done badly from the very start. Whether or not 
those attempting to revive historical identities, (e.g. social democracy, Catholic populism, agrarianism, 
xenophobic nationalism) have been the direct heirs, or even in some cases, the former members of his-
torical parties, or whether the attempts have been made by entrepreneurial young politicians looking to 
cash in on some previous historical success, (e.g. the Slovak National Party) those that gambled on their 
societies possessing the kind of deep and still politicised divisions of the interwar period have been dis-
appointed.  
 
Players, Credible Strategies and Constraints 
 
When accounting for the character of party competition after 1989 we need to consider not only the na-
ture of the communist legacy (especially the personnel of party politics after 1989 and what competitive 
strategies are credibly open to them), but also contingent aspects of the transition itself – critically, the 
existence of a huge core of policy constraints plus the basic level of economic development and thus the 
prospects for economic growth. The predominance of valance issues in the transition, I would argue, is 
the critical factor in understanding why a dominant competitive strategy has emerged across the entire re-
gion. Where a single instant catch-all party becomes hegemonic in a given system, moreover, the temp-
tation for that party to thwart competition, to rewrite the rules of the game in terms of electoral rules and 
constitutional rights between the executive and the legislature, becomes high – as evidenced by govern-
ment proposals to radically rewrite electoral laws in the incumbents’ favour in Slovakia in 1998, and in 
the Czech Republic in 2000, where the formerly hegemonic Civic Democratic Party maintains a minority 
Social Democrat government in order to extract constitutional changes (i.e., more majoritarian electoral 
legislation and curbed presidential powers). This is an important factor when considering the point at 
which institutional rules (as Kitschelt summarises it – the division of power between executive and 
legislature, and electoral rules) may become an exogenous constraint on competitive strategy. Arguably, 
institutional rules become consistently guiding constraints in the formation of party strategy only when 
politics and political expectations becomes routinised. Arguably radical reconfigurations of the party 
scene – made possible by the unpredictable character of instant catch-all competition – stall the routini-
sation of politics by constantly reintroducing uncertainty. For post-patrimonial and post-bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes therefore, institutional constraints remain endogenous so long as instant catch-all 
party politics predominates. 
 
Patterns of Competition 
 
National-Accommodative Communism, the Cases of Poland and Hungary 
 
The more accommodative character of these communist regimes had critical consequences not only for 
the nature of the opposition to emerge after 1989 – i.e., oppositions with roots in surviving and clearly 
identifiable public divisions – but also for the nature of the communist parties themselves. The communist 
parties in both Hungary and Poland were possessed of young, non-ideological, indeed deeply pragmatic 
reform factions able to transform their communist parties, after 1989, into credible, pseudo-leftist pro-
reform forces. The reformed Polish and Hungarian communist parties after 1989 emphasised their techni-
cal expertise – ‘the cult of the manager’ above all. National-accommodative communism, in allowing for 
structured forms of internal opposition and repeated attempts at reform of the state and the economy,
37 
allowed for the existence of credible and explicitly pro-reform technocratic elites on both sides of the re-
gime divide after 1989. In Poland these two technocratic parties emerged from the two main forces of 
national-accommodative communism in the 1980s – from the reform wing of the Polish United Workers   13
Party - the communist party - and from the unified anti-communist opposition movement, the trades un-
ion, Solidarity.  
 
Poland 
 
Depending on initial economic conditions and past experience of reform, the shift from central plan to 
market could still permit a wide variety of reform strategies. In Poland, however, economic conditions in 
1989 were dire, and piecemeal reforms in the 1980s had failed. The familiar controls of central planning 
had collapsed but no market system had evolved to replace them and the system had continued in ‘cosy 
stagnation.’
38 The policy of radical shock therapy: macroeconomic stabilisation, to be followed by sys-
temic change thus emerged clearly as a valence issue immediately after the revolution; the main debate 
among economists being over whether to introduce macroeconomic stabilisation policies first or in con-
junction with systemic reforms. The evidence that marketisation has remained a valence issue comes from 
the fact that both Solidarity governments (1989-1993/1997-); those with roots in the anti-communist 
trades union movement of the 1980s, and the government of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic 
(1993-1997) – the successor party to the Polish United Workers Party – have all continued restrictive 
economic policy. All governments in Poland since 1989 have made explicit promises to continue the pro-
cess of economic reform and to pursue European Union entry – and all have done so in practice. Even at 
the harshest point of shock therapy, in the early 1990s, the Solidarity governments were informally sup-
ported by the successor to the Polish United Workers Party (communist party) the Social Democracy of 
the Polish Republic (SdRP); the latters´ only hope of electoral survival was to prove that they were a 
credible and responsible democratic party, and not the old regime in disguise.  
 
Three years of reform later, following a controversial abortion law, fears that the Church was too inter-
venionist in political life and in the context of growing social costs as a consequence of economic shock 
therapy, the SdRP were elected as technocratic modernisers with a social conscience in 1993. (Precisely 
by virtue of being heirs to the PUWP (and its assets), the former communist technocrats retained some 
resonance as leftists.) In their election campaign they portrayed themselves as non-ideological profession-
als and in government they were revealed as social liberals. Election effectively gave SdRP the chance to 
prove that they really were an entirely new party – democratic and non-recidivist. SdRP’s allies in the 
new government, the Polish Peasant Party allies – a former communist satellite party reestablishing its 
credibility as a party of the countryside, emerged as protectionist and statist and the more reluctant re-
former.
39 The government document “Strategy for Poland – Euro 2006”, promised sustainable growth and 
gradual disinflation to meet EMU criteria by 2006 – a strategy the SdRP pursued until beaten in 1997 (in 
parliamentary seats – their vote rose by 6 percent) by a new alliance of the right – Solidarity Electoral 
Action (AWS). From 1997 to the time of writing AWS has run a reformist government in coalition with 
the Freedom Union, the party of secular radical neo-liberal reformers led by Poland’s first shock therapist; 
Leszek Balcerowicz. Balcerowicz resigned as Finance Minister and the Freedom Union pulled out of gov-
ernment in summer 2000 after AWS failed to be consistent in it support for Balcerowicz’s more radical 
market strategy. 
 
It is evident that the character of state-society relations under national-accommodative communism in 
Poland had a defining impact on the constellation of parties current in the Polish mainstream. When poli-
tics is dominated by valence issues, politicians are necessarily forced back to resort to who they are and 
the skills/resources they possess to appeal to the electorate. Where technocrats can credibly do so their 
clearest strategy is to appeal precisely to their technocratic skills – where elites may have roots in sections 
of society that dissented from communism such elites may appeal to these connections as a source of 
identity, reformist credibility and/or nationalist prestige. The metamorphosis of Leszek Balcerowicz from 
pure technocrat economist, bent on installing as much market reform before politics intervened, to the   14
ever-more coherently liberal free-market politician is highly illuminating. It has occurred, I would argue, 
out of the necessity of competing as a party politician (rather than as Solidarity’s Mr Fix-It) against other 
credible reformers, as it transpired – the SdRP. Balcerowicz’s Freedom Union (UW) nevertheless went 
into the 1997 Polish election campaign on the slogan “left, right but always forward,” thus continuing to 
emphasize the party’s credibility as reformist over and above any form of ideological partisanship. The 
evolution of the right in Poland has also been driven by the competence of the communist successor party 
in other ways. Solidarity Electoral Action emerged in response to the 1993 victory of the SdRP. When 
Solidarity fell apart in 1991 the right splintered so severely as to lose their place in parliament in the 1993 
election.
40 Having learnt that if they stood divided they would fall, a grouping of almost forty right wing/ 
nationalist/religious groupings coalesced into an extremely broad coalition – the AWS – whose election 
campaign stood on national, religious, but most essentially, on anti-communist principles. They thus 
translated their dissident identity into one of positive emphasis on national and religious values. In other 
words they presented their roots as principled Catholic Poles who had opposed communism.  
 
Since the 1997 election the AWS has lurched towards more vocal religiosity and nationalism. This re-
flects their lack of agreement and coherence over ‘technical’ economic reform issues, for which they had 
relied upon their coalition partners, the Freedom Union. The AWS floundered in the run up to the October 
2000 presidential elections, (which the SdRP incumbent, Aleksander Kwasniewski, won outright in the 
first round), having lost momentum in economic policy and beset by scandal, all the more damaging since 
AWS had sold itself as the ‘uncorruptable’ political force in 1997. If  AWS is to compete with the SdRP 
and the UW in the future it is precisely in the realm of the valance issues – economic policy in particular 
– that the nationalist and religious grouping will have to develop – it no longer being enough to rely upon 
the regime divide. There is, however, an alternative competitive option dependent largely on the direction 
of EU accession talks; namely, a slide into nationalist and religious populism, and protectionism in the 
face of an unenthusiastic EU. The idea that nationalism and populism is not electable to govern alone in 
Poland, is arguably entirely contingent on the EU’s willingness to deliver on their promises of early Pol-
ish accession. It is has been widely assumed that EU enlargement has a purely benevolent effect on the 
shaping of party competition in Central Europe. However, the most logical opposition strategy against 
technocratic modernisation – aimed at EU entry – is charismatic/populist nationalism – and if the EU fails 
to deliver it seems fair to say that this strategy may thrive as domestic disappointment and resentment 
grow.  
 
With the SdrP emphasising reform, secular identity, pro-Europeanism and the desire to mitigate the worst 
social costs of transition and Balcerowicz’s Freedom Union as secular, pro-European, anti-communist and 
free-marketeer, one could more optimistically predict that, as the strength of anti-communist feeling fades 
and the economic situation improves (the latter also being contingent on EU accession and with it – 
Polish currency stability and continuing investment), these two parties might enter into an ever more so-
phisticated debate on an economically left/right basis. The logic of this set-up looks well set to lead the 
parties to compete over alternative policy agendas and not just over alternative absolute values about the 
way society should operate.  
 
Hungary 
 
Even more than Poland, Hungary illustrates the inescapability of economic reform at the heart of transi-
tion politics. In Hungary the first post-communist government, conservative and nostalgic, with dissidents 
at its core, tried to continue the gradualist economic approach of the previous regime; introducing restric-
tive monetary, budgetary and income policy only in steps after 1990 in order to avoid what was feared 
would become destabilising public mobilisation. In 1994, however the Hungarian Democratic Forum 
were deselected in favour of former communists, by this time a party of young technocratic modernisers,   15
and it was this government, the Hungarian Socialist Party under Gyula Horn, that not only continued large 
scale privatisation but also launched radical stabilisation (‘shock therapy’), cutting back the bureaucracy 
and social security benefits and kick-starting foreign direct investment.
41 In the second half of the 1990s, 
in order to compete with the latter, another dissident party – FIDESZ, the former Young Liberals, moved 
from liberal left ground to a combination of technocratic economics and pragmatic nationalism – thor-
oughly replacing the Hungarian Democratic Forum as the dominant party of the ‘right.’  
 
As the only country emerging with what looked like instant party politics in 1989 – Hungary is often cited 
as the great exception to the problem of party systems development in the region. And yet in Hungary, as 
elsewhere, political success has followed the most obviously catch-all of all the Hungarian parties, the ex-
communist Hungarian Socialist Party, victorious with a landslide victory in 1994 and FIDESZ – who had 
also resorted to catch-all electoral strategies by May 1998, when they defeated the Socialists. By 1998 
FIDESZ had evidently discovered the mix of technocratic politics and nationalism that allowed them to 
maximise their credibility both as a party of young technocrats and as a party with roots in the dissident 
movement. In the run up to the 1998 election FIDESZ introduced specific issues and problems regarding 
European Union entry and claimed that it would be a tougher negotiator, particularly on agricultural is-
sues, thus setting apart a pragmatic nationalist FIDESZ stall from both the nostalgic nationalism of the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum and more entirely pro-European stance of the Hungarian Socialist Party. 
The Hungarian Socialist Party, the word ‘socialist’ in its title notwithstanding, had projected itself not as 
ideological, nor even of the left so much as a party of technocratic modernisers - modernisation, as Bo-
zoki has pointed out, being equated with secular pro-Europeanism and the imitation of all things ‘modern’ 
and pro-European Union.
42 Another flexible term was also invoked to describe the Hungarian Socialist 
Party; like Schroeder’s SDP in Germany, the HSP designated itself as ‘Blairite’.  
 
What is apparent in Hungary is that parties emphasising pre-communist identity rather than competence 
have either stayed in, or been pushed to the political margins. The socially conservative, religious, tradi-
tionalist, nostalgic, Hungarian Democratic Forum has been electorally punished (winning 3.1 percent of 
the vote in May 1998) by parties who emphasise their pragmatism and their desire to look forward rather 
than backward. Hungarian nationalist nostalgia as a catch-all strategy proved fatally flawed, the barrier 
against it being the impossibility of combining rapid entry into the European Union with any nationalism 
that would most naturally emphasise the shared interests of Hungarians in what used to be ‘Greater Hun-
gary’; i.e., among the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states of Slovakia and Romania. The 
more populist Hungarian Smallholders Party has faired better, winning 13.8 percent of the vote in the first 
round in May 1998, having adopted a catch-all strategy of extreme conservatism and populism (e.g. mak-
ing claims to be pro-EU entry even as it vowed to prevent the sale of farm land to foreigners – a law 
entirely incompatible with EU entry). Recent scandals, however, have pushed the Smallholders too to the 
margins. In the main, the dissident or historical parties have been beaten by parties that understood EU 
entry and economic reform as valence issues and developed competitive strategies on that basis, leaving 
some electoral space in the countryside for those adopting populist opposition to that agenda, à la Meciar. 
As in Poland therefore, you have the development of technocratic parties of former communists and anti-
communists, opening up mainstream Hungarian politics to substantial competition between like-parties.  
 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Czechoslovakia is our one case of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime; the political trajectory of the GDR 
being rendered unique by German reunification. In Czechoslovakia, regime stagnation and extreme ideo-
logical conformity after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 precluded the development of credi-
ble reformist cadres within the Party and perpetuated the severe suppression of political opposition, leav-
ing such opposition as there was fragmented and isolated from society at large. As the Polish dissident   16
Adam Michnik commented at the time, “The underground in post-1968 Czechoslovakia…includes 
…small groups of déclassé oppositionists whose spiritual atmosphere resembles the first Christian com-
munities hiding in the catacombs more than they resemble an illegal political opposition movement.”
43 A 
critical consequence of this regime type was that when Czechoslovak communism ended it ended late in 
the chain of falling regimes, and through revolutionary mass overthrow – not by pact. A Communist Party 
unable to reform itself and yet unwilling to unleash a blood-bath in the heart of Europe eventually capitu-
lated to two ‘civic-blocs’; the Czech Civic Forum and the Slovak Public Against Violence. These opposi-
tion entities amalgamated highly disparate groupings, tenuously linked to the society they claimed to rep-
resent, pulled together by the dissident intellectuals emerging from the cellars.  
 
The problematic legacy of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in terms of the potential constellation of political 
parties was that the dissidents were neither rooted in, nor particularly representative of social divisions – 
nor were extant social divisions transparent. Consequently, if these dissidents, or those cleaving to them 
in the civic movements, were to be electorally entrepreneurial they entered into the political fight in nec-
essarily abstract, and if they were sensible, in vote-maximising terms. As for the communists, the failure 
of the state to seriously attempt reform before 1989 rendered legatees of the Communist Party devoid of 
reformist credibility; revealing the Party to be lacking in the critical mass of leadership and membership 
with the will to transform the Party into a substantively new form. What has been striking about subse-
quent Czech and Slovak political developments is their focus upon issues of transition as such and reli-
ance on the transition itself to be productive of political identities and issues (most notably, economic re-
form, questions of anti-communist retribution and, in more recent years, corruption). What both cases 
suggest, moreover, is extreme contingency in the development and adaptation of electoral strategies in the 
aftermath of bureaucratic-authoritarianism – party politics lacks stabilising roots in either the debates or 
identities of dissident movements, deep and transparent societal cleavages or communist reform move-
ments – it is therefore easily dominated by instant catch-all strategies. This is not to that history does not 
count: it has determined who can credibly play with what strategy.  
 
The Czech and Slovak party systems today cannot be understood without reference to the pre-empting of 
party competition within Czechoslovakia prior to its partition on January 1st 1993. From the revolution 
onwards, the Czech and Slovak Republics respectively carried separate party systems, and each became 
dominated by a single party - Vaclav Klaus’s technocratic Civic Democratic Party in the Czech case, and 
Vladimir Meciar’s populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in Slovakia – increasingly framed 
against each other as the most credible champions of the ‘national interest’ during the dispute over the fu-
ture of the Czechoslovak state. Following the Czech partition of the state after the June 1992 elections, 
the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Movement for a Democratic Party (HZDS) became the found-
ing parties of the newly independent states, and as such both capitalised considerably on state-building 
nationalist legitimation in addition to their original instant catch-all operating styles. 
 
Czech Republic 
 
The stagnation of the Czechoslovak economy since 1988 meant that reforms had already been debated 
and half-hearted reforms attempted prior to the regime collapse. After November 1989, however, a sharp 
drop in output created the pressure for a serious economic reform agenda. Marketisation emerged as a 
broad but vague consensus, but when Valtr Komarek was charged with economic policy and seemed to 
propose gradual reforms and 1968-style continued faith in central state intervention and social market 
prospects it was clear that he was running against high expectations of more rapid change. Given the par-
ticular orthodoxy of Czechoslovak communism the political imperatives of dismantling state control of 
the economy apparently struck the civic movement leaderships even more strongly than those in Hungary 
and Poland, and within a few months more radical market solutions emerged as a strong consensus within   17
the civic movements, an approach obliquely endorsed in the first, plebiscitary elections of June 1990. A 
major problem for would–be political entrepreneurs therefore was to figure out how now – with elections 
pre-set for 1992, they might distinguish themselves, with marketisation a valence issue - in the absence of 
clear social divisions or constituencies. Politicians had thus to tie in the agreed question of marketisation 
to issues of competence (for populism before reform could just look crypto-communist) or to other signi-
fiers of regime change, something which the more entrepreneurial parliamentarians within the civic blocs 
rapidly began to explore; extreme forms of instant catch-all strategy duly emerged as optimal. For the 
credible technocrats in the Civic Forum, Czech economists with roots in the old regime ‘grey zone’ of 
non-political professionals, the clearest path forward was to take the idea of competence in managing eco-
nomic reform to its furthest logical point. Vaclav Klaus, the Civic Forum’s Finance Minister, and founder 
of a new Civic Democratic Party within parliament, duly began to present radical market reform as a 
scientific path to democracy and prosperity.
44 By presenting the ideology of neo-liberalism not as an ide-
ology open to contestation but as something approaching a scientific formula for the return to Europe (one 
of the major promises of the Civic Forum in June 1990), Vaclav Klaus in effect coopted the pre-1989 
culture of political orthodoxy for a new party’s political advantage. 
 
As the Civic Forum’s Federal Finance Minister from 1990 to 1992, and Czech Prime Minister from June 
1992 to 1997, Vaclav Klaus authored an economic reform programme that combined restrictive economic 
policy and an unwillingness to impose bankruptcy, and to begin with these strategies produced marketi-
sation, growth and extremely low social costs in the Czech republic. Having achieved an economic ‘mira-
cle’ of low unemployment and low inflation Klaus seized the political higher ground. His new Civic 
Democratic Party, emerging in parliament in early 1991 out of the Civic Forum,
45 set an agenda that 
promised that all democratic goods, such as European Union entry and the return of liberal social values, 
would flow essentially from economic change, and this neo-liberal brand of technocracy proved extreme-
ly hard to compete against until the onset of economic recession in 1997. Rivals and critics were uniform-
ly dismissed as ignorant of economics, crypto-Bolshevik or utopian. Following the partition of Czecho-
slovakia in 1992, the Civic Democratic Party faced a splintered opposition until the lack of restructuring, 
subsequent recession and corruption scandals finally brought down his governing coalition in November 
1997 – a collapse which introduced an interim government led by the head of the Central Bank, and a call 
for early elections, in June 1998. Until 1997, however, the Civic Democratic Party, seen as supremely 
competent on the economy, had successfully deprived competing parties of that same, essential credibil-
ity.  
 
The contingency of Czech political strategy is indicated by the fact that once economic conditions began 
to worsen, Klaus lost the unique leverage gained through authorship of economic success and support for 
the Czech Social Democracy Party (CSSD) steadily rose. The CSSD is the legatee of the interwar party 
forcibly merged with the communists in 1948. It had failed to enter parliament in the first free elections in 
1990, but had nevertheless emerged as a parliamentary player when former Civic Forum members estab-
lished the a parliamentary Social Democratic Party within parliament via a new party caucus. From within 
parliament then, the Social Democrats reputation grew as a supporter of a state regulated market, as a 
strong critic of Klausite economic reform and as more generally representative of principles derived from 
the Socialist International, presented in the Czech Republic in the reformist terms of kick-starting eco-
nomic growth, fighting against corruption and crime, creating a financial policy and ensuring independent 
courts.  
 
The campaign for early elections, held in June 1998, revealed a degree of disarray and voter volatility 
which took many commentators by surprise. With the Civic Democratic Party weakened through scandal, 
the underdevelopment of party profiles in the Czech Republic was starkly exposed; Klaus’s popularity,   18
having plummeted through Christmas 1997, quickly rose again in the last months before election. The 
Freedom Union, a breakaway faction from the Civic Democratic Party, looked as though it might manage 
to redefine a moderate conservative space on the electoral scene but failed to establish a distinct profile in 
its few months of campaigning. A Pensioners Party arose out of nowhere to gain promises of 10 percent 
support and the far-right Republicans and the far-left Communists gained another 20 percent in opinion 
polls, despite both being taboo as coalition partners. The Czech Social Democracy Party meanwhile em-
phasised anti-corruption, a rejection of ‘arrogance in power’ and what it termed ‘social investment’, but 
the practicalities of these issues remained ambiguous and their opinion polls support wavered massively 
from one week to another. While on a close reading of their manifesto the Social Democrats looked like a 
traditional social democratic party, the main thrust of the campaign was the promise of social cohesion, 
civic society - the very same goals of the dissident Civic Movement back in 1992 – i.e. an alternative 
agenda of change still framed in reference to the communist experience; a less brutally individualistic 
version of transition. 
 
With Klaus’s reformist credibility tarnished by recession the Civic Democratic Party switched tactics in 
June 1998 to play on the charismatic strategy of portraying Klaus, as an individual, as synonymous with 
Czech transformation. The party’s election slogan in 1998 was a classic of transition populism: ‘If you 
believe in yourself – vote Klaus’ – a reduction of political preference to a question of individual self-
esteem. More destructive of competition, however, was Klaus’s insistence that the ODS remained the 
country’s only democratic party, whilst all others were to be understood as anti-system. On the last day of 
campaigning, the ODS placed notices across the country proclaiming ‘Mobilisace,’ (as in 1938) calling on 
the people to defend their freedom while they may. Klaus’s political eviction back in November 1997 was 
explained away as a political assassination; the manifesto referred to ‘the road from Sarejevo’ and drew 
parallels with the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.  
 
Following the victory of Milos Zeman’s Social Democrat party in 1998 Klaus astonished Czech commen-
tators by putting the ODS behind a Social Democrat minority government by means of an opposition 
agreement, though the CSSD had been denounced only weeks before as an enemy of the democratic state. 
Through the opposition agreement the ODS have extracted an electoral law introducing more majoritarian 
electoral rules; the new law effectively evicts emerging competitors on both left and right from the politi-
cal game. If these institutional changes and unexpected alliances indicate profound political uncertainty, 
so too does the basic contingency and opportunism evident in the development of political identity among 
the main political players. Instead of seeing the emergence of two core technocratic parties as we do in 
Poland and Hungary, in the Czech Republic, the ODS’s technocratic credibility – overblown in the early 
1990s - has been tarnished by recession, pushing a shift towards populism and Euro-skeptic nationalism – 
thus drawing a new line between itself and the Social Democrats. This has left room for an emerging 
group of technocratic pro-Europeans rightist parties who might benefit from their wish to normalise the 
Czech ‘right’ and take out Klaus’s revolutionary bombast – if the new electoral law will allow them to. 
 
The Social Democrats meanwhile house both genuine ‘68-er’ leftists and former communists (including 
its leader – Milos Zeman) and frustrated younger would-be technocrats. The CSSD thus carry both more 
genuine leftism and more tenuous reform credibility than either of the successor communist parties in 
Hungary and Poland. The Social Democrats in government have been forced to tread an unhappy path in 
terms of their own developing electoral identity - they have proved more diligent in pro-EU legislation 
(the recession left them little choice), but in gaining some of the marketising credibility that hitherto had 
accrued only to the CDP they have damaged their more leftist credentials. Facing that inevitability in 
1998 Milos Zeman had declared himself Prime Minister of a ‘Suicide Government’ and commented ‘We 
have suffered a victory.’
46    19
It is worth noting, moreover, because the Czech press discuss little else on their front pages, that the issue 
of political corruption is also proving destructive of more programmatic competition. The accusation of 
corruption provides perfect fodder for populist mobilisation; populism, writes Meny, “is founded above 
all on a moralistic vision of the world: the healthy, bold and hard-working people have conserved national 
virtues against the exploiting, technocratic, profiteering, fraudulent and corrupt minority in power [or pre-
viously in power]…corruption is instrumental in disqualifying the elites.”
47 When all political sides ac-
cuse each other in similar vein, however, the more immediate result is that the electorate becomes dis-
gusted with their political system – a result born out by Czech opinion polls which carry persistently low 
esteem for both government and parliament, which have focused on corruption as an obvious political 
weapon. Fights over corruption as with competition over credible delivery of change, remains the contin-
gent politics of the modus operandi rather than politics of programmatic alternatives. Since scandals may 
be real or invented moreover, corruption offers a particularly murky political route.  
 
Slovakia 
 
The instant catch-all strategy to emerge in Slovakia was far more straightforwardly opportunist than that 
devised by Klaus in the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, a former communist and lawyer, Vladimir Meciar, 
developed a party of increasingly hegemonic status by observing what other parties were doing, why they 
were failing and by duly positioning his own, extremely entrepreneurial party in the space that remained. 
Vladimir Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia had emerged as a faction from the anti-
communist Public Against Violence in 1991 – i.e., in parliament. In 1990 as the Public Against Vio-
lence’s prime minister, Meciar had supported Klausite reform and been pro-liberalisation and marketi-
sation – in accordance with the post-revolutionary consensus. The subsequent Slovak experience of fed-
eral economic policy was unfavourable however; between 1990 and 1992 the Slovaks experienced three 
times the unemployment levels of the Czechs and one-ninth of the foreign direct investment. Moreover, 
by 1992, Czech dogmatism in terms of the refusal to moderate federal policy to accommodate Slovakia’s 
structural disadvantages – even to offer a rhetorical recognition of their existence – rendered radical 
marketisation an increasingly untenable position for any Slovak political entrepreneur.  
 
Through 1991 and 1992 Meciar situated his Movement between Slovak Nationalists and Christian Demo-
crats, who were attempting, and failing, to resurrect historical political identities, and Slovak liberals, who 
demonstrated their social isolation by persisting in support of federal economic reform – against all odds 
– only to fall on their own swords in June 1992 by entering into an electoral coalition with the Czech 
Civic Democratic Alliance (an ODS ally and the one openly nationalist party in the Czech Republic!). In 
addition, moreover, Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia had increasingly gained ground by 
criticising the technocratic economic policies coming from Prague as unfair, even as it maintained a 
broadly pro-reform position. Meciar’s rising dominance of Slovak politics throughout the 1990s is indica-
tive of two things: first, of the success of bureaucratic-authoritarian communism in separating dissident 
elites from societal roots and, second, of the vulnerability of Slovak political development to contingent 
phenomena; e.g., the extent to which initial Czech economic dogmatism distorted marketisation as a va-
lence issue in Slovak political life. In these conditions Meciar developed the most electorally sensitive 
strategy: populism and a seemingly bottomless self-serving pragmatism on the policy front.  
 
Following Slovak independence Meciar’s Movement could hardly openly continue the radical reform 
policies that it had increasingly criticised in the federation, and yet economic reform was far from com-
plete. Meciar floundered and reacted through 1993 and 1994, with restrictive monetary policy and grow-
ing budgetary imbalances, stalling of the privatisation process and populist slogans, in an attempt to keep 
the process on track but with lower social and electoral costs. The Movement duly haemorrhaged the sin-
cere reformers it had housed under the federation and was finally ousted in a no-confidence vote in March   20
1994. As in the Czech Republic in 1998, however, the loss of one hegemonic instant catch-all party re-
vealed the disarray in the rest of the party scene. The subsequent interim coalition of non-Meciar forces 
was deeply divided and yet sufficiently responsible to introduce enough reforms to bring great economic 
pain just before fresh elections occurred in six months time. When these coalition partners fought against 
each other in the subsequent campaign, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was re-elected. The new 
Meciar government (1994-1998) continued with half-measures, but this time more decisively so, combin-
ing these with systematic corruption and a increasingly virulent, xenophobic and racist form of populist 
nationalism. 
 
That formerly pro-market parties – such as Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia – should resort 
to demagogic politics  e.g., declaring policies of joining the EU and accusing the EU of conspiring to hu-
miliate the country, pro-market rhetoric accompanied by the abandonment of free market principles for 
fiscal expansionism and reckless borrowing etc. is one obvious way out of the competition dilemma posed 
by too many major competitive issues being valance issues – i.e., an attempt to pool constituencies 
through charismatic grievance mongering (populist) and reckless public spending. As already mentioned, 
however, the economic costs of this strategy are electorally as well as economically devastating – in Me-
ciar’s case, leading to his ouster in 1998 and transforming his once diverse electorate into a hard core of 
rural pensioners and the lower-educated. Until Meciar’s regime became more explicitly authoritarian, i.e., 
by 1997-98, the parties of the opposition had had tremendous difficulties in formulating appealing pro-
grammes to counter Meciar’s populism, failing for years to escape from reactive campaigning and inter-
party bickering. By 1998, however, Slovakia was internationally isolated, corruption scandals engulfed 
the government and, fortunately, a blatantly gerrymandering pre-election electoral law finally jolted the 
hitherto fragmented opposition into a common electoral bloc. In the face of Meciar’s growing belliger-
ence the latter could fight together on a positive, if basic, restatement of the Slovak democratic and mar-
ketising project. In government since 1998, however, the bloc has suffered from continual internal friction 
– it is, after, all, an ideologically unnatural alliance that survives on the minimal condition of a common 
rejection of Meciarism.  
 
Slovakia’s latest political innovation is a party calling itself Smer (Direction), formed in 1999 and led by 
the Party of the Democratic Left’s former rising star Robert Fico. Smer is essentially a one-man party and 
Fico – who regularly garners 30 percent support in the polls, is Slovakia’s most popular politician after 
Meciar. Smer is a technocratic instant catch-all party in an extreme form. Fico claims that the combina-
tion of his leadership and special ‘committees of experts’ (Smer’s entire structure if you discount the po-
litical unknowns selected to run on its party lists) will cut through Slovakia’s endless ‘politicking’ and 
solve Slovakia’s ills as they are heard from the vox populi. Fico’s appeal comes from his capacity to tap 
into popular discontent with the lack of accountability in Slovak politics – between Meciar’s chronic un-
predictability and a governing coalition of such unnatural bedfellows as former communists and the 
Christian Democrats they used to lock up. In this light, the Slovak electorate, not surprisingly, finds some 
real appeal in a man who presents the transition purely as a technical problem deserving of undivided 
professional attention. It is often said that populism and technocracy are incompatible; Smer’s proposed 
slogan for elections in 2002, however, is ‘no more promises’ a negation of the basic principle of account-
able party politics and a brilliant fusion of populist and technocratic appeal. 
 
Patrimonial Communist Regimes– Romania and Bulgaria 
 
As with bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, political strategists emerging from patrimonial communism 
could have little certainty about the scope or nature of their liberated electorates, but given their economic 
conditions and political and economic history, even less scope for relying on the idea of radical change 
and major economic restructuring as popular notions. The most rational electoral strategy therefore has   21
been to promise change without pain – and that promise, and the resulting slow and stuttering pace of re-
form, on the whole, is what we have seen – with instant catch-all strategies of various types being used to 
cover what is essentially stony electoral ground. If one looks at the structuring of political strategies after 
the bureaucratic-authoritarian communism of Czechoslovakia, it is apparent that Czech and Slovak party 
developments have been highly contingent upon transition-specific events such as the partition of the fed-
eration
48 and in reaction to major reforms that in themselves have revealed new areas for political contes-
tation – not so much about redistribution as about corruption, institution-building and market-regulation. 
Romania and Bulgaria have faced the same unavoidability of painful economic reform; the same lack of 
internal societal cleavages/clear constituencies; the same lack of societally rooted political elites, and to 
cap it all – both have possessed even less scope for contestation over the pace of reform since rapid 
reform looked likely to introduce truly severe societal dislocation, hardship and consequently, electoral 
punishment. The result has been instant catch-all strategies so evasive of reform issues or lacking in real-
istic reform proposals that when coupled with economic failure, they have tended to make party elites 
look either impotent or corrupt or both in the face of intractably difficult economic conditions. Only when 
economic conditions have gone to extremes of hyperinflation – as in Bulgaria in 1997, have governments 
been free to take an active reformist line. 
 
Although the actual transfer of power in Bulgaria and Romanian differe dramatically there are some criti-
cal points of similarity in terms of communist legacy, the most apparent being the continuing dominance 
of former communist party forces in society and the diffuse and profoundly inexperienced nature of the 
opposition. The nature of the transfer of power itself, however, had significant impact on where new po-
litical forces could locate themselves. Whereas in Bulgaria the pressure on the Communist Party had real-
ly come from within the Party itself, as a generational conflict – thus providing the Party reformists with 
some initial credibility as reformists per se (which they lost steadily when in government from 1990 to 
1991 and then entirely from 1990-91/1994-97). The overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania, described by 
Ken Jowitt as a ‘movement of rage’, came in a violent battle between the exhausted people and the mega-
lomaniac regime. It was extremely unclear in the aftermath of the Romanian revolution which parties had 
roots where, since, despite the fact that the National Salvation Front had been put together by political in-
siders, all emergent elites repudiated any connection to the former regime. The ‘mode of extrication’ from 
communism of itself therefore was productive of credible and less credible paths of political development 
for the elites involved. 
 
Romania 
 
The National Salvation Front emerged as a far more ambiguous terminator of the previous regime and the 
previous political economy than did the Czechoslovak Civic Forum or the Public Against Violence. The 
victors of Romania’s first elections were the NSF’s Ion Iliescu as president with 85 percent of the vote 
and the National Salvation Front, with 66 percent of seats in the Assembly of Deputies and 67 percent of 
those in the Senate. The elections were held too soon for parties other than the Front to organise effec-
tively, the Front also maintained power over the media and refused to allow independent stations, in addi-
tion to suppressing the electoral material of their rivals. Like the Civic Forum in the Czech Republic the 
NSF presented itself as a force of change but this time, in emphatically painless terms. In the aftermath of 
the revolutionary blood-letting the continuation of political conflict was to be avoided and the NSF called 
for an “original democracy” and offered “unity in word and action”; or yet more starkly, as the NSF’s 
Silviu Brucan put it; “Our ideology consists of five points: more food, more heat, more electricity and 
light, better transportation and better health care.”
49 With an electoral base apparently made up of former 
party officials, peasants and unskilled workers, the Front proceeded to re-establish a hybrid and very 
weak and apparently unstable form of vaguely reformist neo-communist rule – populism – in effect – that   22
failed to disband the vicious securitate apparatus of the previous regime. With such ease of continuity 
there were few incentives to begin serious structural reforms. After attempting to govern for three years 
through (inflationary) spending and populism – reform without pain – however, the PSDR
50 implemented 
stabilisation packages in early 1994. In other areas, notably privatisation, the PSDR also proceeded incre-
mentally and inconsistently, to slowly marketise the economy – its populist rhetoric notwithstanding.
51 
 
As Pop-Eleches has argued in his discussion of ‘The Art of Half-Way Reforms’ as practiced by the PSDR 
– the PSDR government’s policy was far more pragmatically reformist in practice than the party’s rheto-
ric had implied – a practice taken up by the Democratic Convention immediately after its election in 
1996. This timidity in claiming explicit authorship and responsibility indicates a persistently high level of 
political uncertainty as to what the Romanian electorate will ‘take’ at the same time as an awareness that 
continuing stagnation is also a vote loser – thus economic stabilisation represents an unavoidable hurdle 
in electoral terms if incumbents wish to stay ‘electable’. This is not to say that Romania is a political 
tabula rasa, but that has taken years of trial and error before Romanian governments have ascertained 
electoral tendencies. In such conditions it is has been safer to compete on consensual issues (that it would 
be preferable to have no major shocks) than otherwise.  
 
The nationalist catch-all elements of mainstream Romanian political life can be shown to follow sheer 
government-forming expedience. Following the 1992 elections the PSDR required the parliamentary sup-
port of the nationalist Greater  Romania Party, the Romanian Socialist Labour Party, and that of the ultra-
nationalist and populist Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), whose power base stood in the ethni-
cally divided region of Translyvania. The PSDR hesitated to bring the unpredictable, (and internationally 
embarrassing) PUNR into government, but capitulated in 1994. When the Greater Romania Party and the 
Socialist Labour Party withdrew, the PSDR became dependent on the PUNR and the tensions between the 
two parties deepened. The hope that the pragmatism of being in government might deter the PUNR’s na-
tionalist extremism proved mistaken
52. The PUNR dragged the PSDR into a heightened nationalist rheto-
ric (the Ceausescu regime had, of course, used nationalist mobilisation) and the PSDR’s discrete ambi-
tions to foster good relations with the west and to deliver on the evidently publicly popular goods of EU 
and NATO membership were damaged both by association and by their own adjustment. When the 
PUNR split from the PSDR only months before the 1996 election, the always troubled legislative process 
in Romania practically ground to a halt. (It is worth noting, however, that the PSDR and PUNR were nev-
ertheless similar in competitive terms. Both came out of the Ceausescu apparat, both relied on nepotism 
and patronage to build clientelistic networks, and both have emphasized “personalities, conspiracy theo-
ries, and heady rhetoric over political institutions or economic programmes”
53).  
 
According to Patapievici, five ‘values’ had coordinated the PSDR/Iliescu regime: 1) reform meant read-
justment, not change; 2) the structures of the socialist state were good in essence but had been distorted 
by Ceauscescu; 3) a geopolitical orientation towards the West was risky, so Romania should basically 
stick with the East; 4) the competent people were those trained in the Communist style; 5) patriotism nec-
essarily presupposed nationalism.
54 As economic conditions deteriorated, the PSDR government duly re-
sorted to increasingly extreme nationalist legitimation. For the 1996 elections Iliescu ran a highly person-
alised and sporadically nationalistic campaign, accusing the opposition essentially of wanting to sell out 
Romania to the Hungarians.  
 
The 1996 elections, it was hoped, would act as the revolution postponed, having resulted in the victory of 
the opposition Democratic Convention of Romania (DCR) and its presidential candidate, Emil Constan-
tinescu, and a plurality in parliament. The Democratic Convention, however, has proved a slowly evolv-
ing monolith; it has always been fraught with tensions, having emerged as a grouping of eighteen parties 
and political organisations. It is indeed a testimony to the anti-communist solidarity achievable against the   23
Iliescu regime that it took until 1995 for the Convention to lose the Social Democratic Party and a number 
of smaller liberal parties, and it still entered the 1996 race as a broad ‘civic’ alliance dominated by the 
National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party along with the National Liberal Party and the National 
Liberal Party-Democratic Convention. Even so reduced, the minimal common ground of the Convention 
is on the desire for reform and in anti-communism. Having learned the lessons of the 1992 election, 
where their negative moral campaign against ‘neo-communism’ and ‘crypto-communism’ failed against 
the exaggerated promises of the PSDR, the elections in 1996 were dominated by neutral, technical lan-
guage. Religious faith had also become a must for election candidates, commensurate with a growing re-
ligious feeling in the population.
55 Evidently the nationalist catch-all strategy was now challenged by an 
emerging technocratic agenda. As part of the DCR effort to mark a departure from PSDR practices, the 
DCR manifesto, “The Contract With Romania” was specific in policy proposals, including twenty prom-
ises to the rural population, young people, women, pensioners, business people, taxpayers and people 
working in education, health culture and defense. These promises were presented as concrete measures 
and deadlines were established for their fulfillment. The DCR was clearly attempting to introduce the 
concepts of accountability, seeking to provide clear criteria by which to measure the delivery of out-
comes. Having made such promises, including social protection, however, no indications were made of 
where the resources would be found.
56  
 
In order to form a cabinet, the DCR went into coalition with the nationalist Magyar’s Democratic Forum 
and the Social Democratic Union, which, despite declaring itself as centre-left is in reality scarcely differ-
ent in its policies from the supposedly centre-right DCR. As Popescu points out, the ideological differ-
ences in Romanian mainstream parties are hard to distinguish – the only genuinely right-wing party – the 
Liberal National Alliance, which favours radical changes, obtained less than 2 percent of the vote. More-
over, there is, in fact, no traditionalist leftist party in the Romania landscape since all parties, including 
the ‘socialists,’ have favoured the development of a market economy in practice if not in rhetoric, even as 
they emphasized the idea of welfare protection. It is a telling indicator of the scale of problems faced in 
the Romanian economy, the fear among the more democratic elites that the costs of real reform would not 
be borne by the voting population, and the flexibility afforded by an instant catch-all strategy, that the 
DCR declared its intention of liberalising the economy only after taking power in 1996.
57 Subsequent 
coalition in-fighting, corruption and state incapacity moreover, has severely stalled these reform aspira-
tions in practice, hence the likely return of Iliescu to the presidency in a more openly technocratic guise. 
As with the anti-Meciar forces of Slovakia, the tensions of party definition and factional interest have 
continued to plague the Democratic Convention of Romania since it gained power. At the time of writing 
Iliescu is poised to return as Romanian president. 
 
Bulgaria 
 
Georgi Karasimeonov has identitied Bulgaria as a case of ‘delayed differentiation,’
58 and this can be ex-
plained in terms of the failure of the anti-communist technocratic party, the United Democratic Front, to 
produce a credible reform package during its brief spell in government, from 1991 to 1992, the relative 
success of the Bulgarian Socialist Party in promising a ‘gradual transition’ and the horrendous economic 
consequences of BSP economic policy when in government from 1994 to 1997. If located anywhere party 
competition appeared stalled across the most basic axis of being communist or anti-communist. Up until 
the 1994 elections the aggressive anti-communism of the UDF provoked reactions from the only partially 
reformed BSP which in turn resulted in unstable governments and a legislature blocked and fragmented 
by eventual internal party splits and regroupings both in the UDF and the BSP (the UDF evolving from 
fifteen units to one party between 1990 and 1997).  
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Between 1993 and 1994 Bulgaria saw a non-party technocratic cabinet and attempts to form new political 
groupings ‘between’ the BSP and UDF, both of whom seemed to be alienating and frustrating the elector-
ate with their fruitless and insubstantial confrontations. These new groupings, the Democratic Alternative 
for the Republic (DAR) in particular, nevertheless opted for programmes of such vagueness (the DAR 
campaigned for ‘national reconciliation’) that they failed to achieve the 4-percent threshold to enter the 
parliament in 1994. In the 1994 elections the Bulgarian Socialist Party, in coalition with BANU and the 
Political Club Ekoglasnost, won an overwhelming victory with 52 percent of the vote
59 – the first majority 
government in parliament since 1989. The BSP had evidently managed to capitalise on the public’s dis-
appointment with the haphazard technocratic governments between 1990 and 1994 which had brought 
only economic stagnation, little reform, growing foreign debt and rising crime; problems mainly asso-
ciated with the UDF despite the fact that the UDF was only in power as such in 1992. Despite having 
promised accelerated reform and Czech-style coupon privatisation – with its egalitarian appeal – in 1994, 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party in power proved reluctant reformers and reckless subsidy-givers and public 
spenders in practice, and the Bulgarian economy moved toward crisis and hyperinflation by the beginning 
of 1997. Demonstrations brought the Socialist government to an end two years before their mandate ex-
pired, and in early elections in April 1997 the UDF won 52 percent of the vote – a revamped and rational-
ised party under Ivan Kostov, and with a technocratic reformist president in the form of Peter Stoyanov. 
This new government, moreover, has persisted on an exceptionally difficult course following the seven 
year delay in implementing reform.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Persistent elite autonomy, resulting from the top-heavyness of the party system and the lack of deep party 
competition on policy may be functional in one respect; it may provide critical administrative and policy-
making flexibility in managing the transition and creating pragmatic coalitions. Such practical autonomy 
nevertheless makes it impossible for the electorate to hold politicians to account for their actions other 
than attempting to judge their own country’s performance in the interim in the broadest possible terms – 
they can then reject one peculiarly non-committal group for another. In the meantime, it remains impossi-
ble for electorates to anticipate what a party will do in practice. The most obvious illustration of how 
flexible, indeed, necessary, nationalist, populist and technocratic principles have been in reality lays in the 
fact that Hungarian, Polish and Romanian ‘post-communists,’ Slovak populists and Christian Democrats 
and Czech technocrats of all shades have all implemented fiscal austerity measures. 
 
All three types of catch-all party I would argue have strong potential to generate instability – technocrats 
stand in danger of trivialising or failing to deal with real political conflicts of interest by insisting that 
their chosen ‘method’ must not be contravened, or, in more populist mode, by insisting that experts can 
resolve everything; both options being a gift to populists or extremists who can then claim that only they 
understand those who have lost in the transition. Technocrats who present European Union entry as a 
panacea are opening the way to populists and nationalists when entry becomes problematic. Populists 
may tend to authoritarian practices since the claim of talking for ordinary people may be used to justify 
practically any policy under the sun, making purely populist government highly, if not completely unpre-
dictable, and consequently extremely difficult to oppose. As for nationalist governments, state-building 
nationalism may be benign in theory but in practice, most notably where it has combined with populism, 
this has tended to be extremely exclusive in practice in particular where the smallest and most vulnerable 
minorities – such as the Roma – have been concerned.  
  
Several particular problems may arise from the nature of party development in the region, the most obvi-
ous being the difficulty in establishing stable partisan identification and consequently system stabilisation 
when parties remain identified more by ‘modes of operation’ than by any coherent ideological labels such   25
as left and right. Crewe suggested that “a rapid turnover of parties in the early 1990s is likely.… The de-
velopment of partisan self-images among voters is therefore likely to be an identification with a political 
tendency (nationalism, liberal cosmopolitanism, Catholic values etc.) rather than with a particular par-
ty,”
60 and yet one may ask what these tendencies may amount to in conditions of persistent instant catch-
all competition, where these limited political identities or tendencies may be co-opted by one highly flex-
ible group after another. When parties with the word ‘socialist’ or ‘social democratic’ in their names, such 
as the Hungarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, turn out to im-
plement austerity measures and radical economic reform in the same vein as those proposed by the pro-
claimed neo-liberals and liberals, and when self-proclaimed Czech libertarians team up with self-
proclaimed Czech social democrats to stitch up the opposition (the result of the June 1998 Czech opposi-
tion agreement) then voters are unlikely to feel that their vote is deeply meaningful. Aware that voters 
might be suffering from a sense of the inadequacy of accountability, one can imagine political entrepre-
neurs in turn beginning to capitalise on that very fact. Indeed, such a strategy is already clear in the case 
of the Slovak party ‘Direction’. Here we see a young politician emphasising the idea that transition is, in 
sum, an unpredictable and essentially technical problem, and offering his party unashamedly as one of ex-
perts who should be trusted like philosopher kings. Instead of offering deeper accountability, Direction 
tries to make a virtue out of offering none at all – taking technocratic politics to its logical, supposedly be-
nign dictatorial conclusions. 
 
Another, critical implication of having party competitions characterised by low commitment and identifi-
cation in terms of policy, and dominated by policy-taking, rather than policy-making behaviour, is that we 
need to reexamine what we understand by executive strength in the region. Shugart defines executive 
strength as ‘the degree to which the executive is able to put an independent stamp on the legislative output 
of the system, i.e., executive strength equals those powers derived not from partisan support in the legisla-
ture but those that derive from authority vested constitutionally in the office regardless of whether the ex-
ecutive enjoys a legislative majority.”
61 According to Shugart, “parliamentary executives are by definition 
weak and characterised by a high degree of party strength.” Clearly where parties are non-committal be-
yond the very broadest statements of intent, even a parliamentary executive retains extraordinary autono-
my in policy definition. 
 
The prospects for party political development in our six cases vary but, according to this model, prospects 
for the deepening programmatic qualities of party competition are considerably better in Poland and Hun-
gary than elsewhere. It is unusual these days to see these four countries placed together, but in several im-
portant respects the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania face similar challenges, in that they 
are all suffering the political disarray and instability inherent in an instant catch-all party system where 
only one or no credible technocratic parties exist. The Czech Republic currently operates under considera-
bly more political uncertainty than either Hungary or Poland, as indicated by election turnout for the up-
per house, the Senate in 1998, of only 20 percent and by a protest movement calling itself ‘Thank you, 
now leave,’ which in 1999 declared a request that all political leaders stand down; 25 percent of those 
polled said they would vote for any new party emerging out of the protest movement. 
 
Finally, it is widely assumed that the commitment to European Union enlargement is a political asset for 
Central Europe; the prospect is said to motivate and safeguard the process toward democratic consolida-
tion insofar as it exacts policy and institutional standards across the board. One might argue that this 
could have a debilitating effect, arresting party development and party competition at a partial equilibrium 
precisely by excluding from political competition those substantive, grassroots and ideology-based policy 
conflicts around which Western European party systems evolved, however, one could counter this kind of 
argument with the comparative point that this would hardly matter if competition of sorts nevertheless   26
was managed and these countries began, like Germany in the aftermath of war, to converge with current 
EU standards of law and living. If EU enlargement is stalled, however, then the pegging of reform to the 
idea of necessary conditions for EU entry may have proved a hostage to fortune. As Meciar in Slovakia 
made clear, once you give up on the idea of Union entry, (or, what would be more dangerous still, are 
forced to give it up), then valence issues are far less clear, and a whole new ballgame begins. In the 
meantime, however, so long as valence issues remain dominant, and until growth opens up the possibility 
of real policy adjustments in socially ameliorative directions, it is hard to see how this electoral experi-
ence could encourage a sense of personal political agency among the voting public; a potentially serious 
hostage-to-fortune in terms of persuading populations into the participatory optimism of democracy.  
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